Monopoly Versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly

13 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2002

See all articles by Rabah Amir

Rabah Amir

University of Arizona - Department of Economics; University of Arizona

Niels Nannerup

University of Southern Denmark

Anna Stepanova

University of Southern Denmark, Odense

Eline Eguiazarova

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics

Abstract

In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D.

Suggested Citation

Amir, Rabah and Nannerup, Niels and Stepanova, Anna and Eguiazarova, Eline, Monopoly Versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly. The Manchester School, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 88-100, January 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=309304

Rabah Amir (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )

Tucson, AZ 85721
United States

University of Arizona ( email )

Department of History
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States

Niels Nannerup

University of Southern Denmark ( email )

Department of Business and Economics
Campusvej 55
DK-5230 Odense M
Denmark
+45 65 50 33 44 (Phone)
+45 66 15 87 90 (Fax)

Anna Stepanova

University of Southern Denmark, Odense

Campusvej 55
Odense DK-5230, 5000
Denmark

Eline Eguiazarova

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics ( email )

Faculty of Social Sciences
Campusvej 55
DK-5230 Odense M
Denmark

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