Marketing Mutual Funds

81 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2018 Last revised: 11 Sep 2020

See all articles by Nikolai L. Roussanov

Nikolai L. Roussanov

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hongxun Ruan

Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

Yanhao 'Max' Wei

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2, 2020

Abstract

Marketing and distribution expenses are responsible for about a third of the cost of active management in the mutual fund industry. We develop and estimate a structural model of mutual fund marketing with learning about unobserved skill and costly investor search. Our estimates suggest that marketing is nearly as important as performance and fees for determining
fund size. Eliminating marketing substantially improves welfare, as capital shifts towards
cheaper funds and competition decreases fees. Average alpha increases as active funds shrink,
and capital allocation becomes more closely aligned with manager skill net of fees. Declining investor search costs over time imply a reduction in marketing expenses and management fees
as well as a shift towards passive investing, as observed empirically.

Keywords: mutual funds, distribution costs, broker commissions, performance evaluation, capital misallocation, investor welfare, financial regulation, structural estimation, search costs, information frictions, household finance

JEL Classification: G11, G28, D14, M31

Suggested Citation

Roussanov, Nikolai L. and Ruan, Hongxun and Wei, Yanhao, Marketing Mutual Funds (February 2, 2020). Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3093438 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093438

Nikolai L. Roussanov (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Hongxun Ruan

Guanghua School of Management, Peking University ( email )

Peking University
Beijing, Beijing 100871
China

Yanhao Wei

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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