Disclosure, Competition and Learning from Asset Prices
52 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2018 Last revised: 11 Jan 2020
Date Written: January 9, 2020
I study voluntary disclosure of oligopoly firms when they learn information from asset prices. By disclosing information, a firm incurs a cost of losing competitive advantage to its rivals but benefits from learning from a more informative asset market. Adding a financial market helps the product market to escape from a bad nondisclosure equilibrium. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, leading to multiple equilibria. Due to the endogenous disclosure behavior of firms, more fierce competition in the product market can reduce consumer surplus and total surplus, and more noise trading in the financial market can increase price informativeness.
Keywords: Disclosure, product market competition, proprietary cost, feedback effect, complementarity, total surplus, price informativeness
JEL Classification: D61, G14, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation