The Fictitious Liberal Divide: Economic Rights are Not Basic

Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics, Volume 10, Issue 2, Autumn 2017, pp. 1-23.

23 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2018 Last revised: 12 Jul 2018

Date Written: December 22, 2017

Abstract

The main question dividing classical and high liberals is about how economic rights rank compared to other rights and public goals. That is, the question is about what can or cannot outweigh such rights. High liberals argue that economic rights can be outweighed by any legitimate state interest, such that they are prima facie rights. Neoclassical liberals, conversely, have recently sought to elevate economic rights to basic rights, which could then only be outweighed by other basic rights. This paper shows where the real debate should be for classical liberals, challenging Samuel Freeman’s widely held distinction between classical and high liberalism. Economic rights are prima facie for all liberals in that they can be outweighed by, say, considerations of utility or social justice. Although neoclassical liberals are correct to say that such rights are much more important than high liberals normally recognize, it does not follow that economic rights are basic.

Keywords: basic rights, classical liberalism, economic rights, eminent domain, high liberalism, neoclassical liberalism

JEL Classification: A13, P14, H13

Suggested Citation

Melkevik, Åsbjørn, The Fictitious Liberal Divide: Economic Rights are Not Basic (December 22, 2017). Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics, Volume 10, Issue 2, Autumn 2017, pp. 1-23.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3097478

Åsbjørn Melkevik (Contact Author)

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
15
Abstract Views
105
PlumX Metrics