Team Size, Noisy Signals, and the Career Prospects of Academic Scientists

Abstract

Team production is increasingly common in bench science, because scientists specialize and then combine their skills in a team. We argue that team production makes it more difficult to identify the quality of a junior scientist, as her productivity cannot be perfectly distinguished from others in the team. We develop a model of promotions within academic science: funding organizations observe the output of academic teams, and decide how much funding to award to each scientist. An exogenous change in the size of teams implies noisier signals. In response, funding organizations rationally tilt more of the funding toward senior scientists. Junior scientists have reduced prospects of ever obtaining enough funding to run their own laboratory. Using data from academic science, we show that when the size of scientific teams increased, there is evidence of fewer promotions, more funding to senior scientists, and more mid-career exit. We apply the insights gained to thinking about teamwork and promotions in organizations.

Keywords: team size, promotions, scientists, careers, economic model

JEL Classification: D21, O31