Political Activism as a Determinant of Clientelistic Transfers: Evidence from an Indian Public Works Program

Posted: 10 Jan 2018

See all articles by Nancy H. Chau

Nancy H. Chau

Cornell University - School of Applied Economics and Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yanyan Liu

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Vidhya Soundararajan

Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 4, 2018

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature by developing a model of political clientelism based on an under-explored citizen attribute - political activism, in addition to two other attributes: political affiliation and income. The model uncovers the role of "politically active" individuals in their ability to influence and shape opinion, as well as the inclination of politicians to offer targeted transfers to this group in order to indirectly influence other voters (ie., activists or undecided voters).

Keywords: INDIA, SOUTH ASIA, ASIA, politics, political power, information transfer, political parties, political clientelism, political activism, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS)

JEL Classification: D70, H50

Suggested Citation

Chau, Nancy H. and Liu, Yanyan and Soundararajan, Vidhya, Political Activism as a Determinant of Clientelistic Transfers: Evidence from an Indian Public Works Program (January 4, 2018). IFPRI Discussion Paper 1700. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098865

Nancy H. Chau (Contact Author)

Cornell University - School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-4463 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yanyan Liu

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Vidhya Soundararajan

Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore ( email )

Bannerghatta Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560076
India

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