Lessons from More than a Decade-Long History of Sanction in France

LabEx ReFi Working Paper Series No. 2017-11

44 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2018

See all articles by Laure de Batz

Laure de Batz

Institute of Economic Studies; Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - LabEx Refi

Date Written: October 01, 2017

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the main characteristics and evolution along time of the sanctions pronounced by the French Financial Market Authority (AMF) since its creation. We consider an original exhaustive sample of 308 decisions, published on the AMF website over the period 2004-2016. Most of the sanctions resulted in a guilty verdict (90%), mostly associated with financial fines (94%) and/or with disciplinary sanctions (30%), after long procedures (2.7 years on average, followed potentially by appeals). Half of them were first published anonymized. The most frequently sanctioned market participants are listed companies, followed by asset managers or asset management companies. The sample under review was enlarged from 2012 onwards with a new kind of procedure, the settlements (32 from 2012 to 2016). The latter do not imply guilt recognition from part of the offender. Such procedures are by law quicker, target less severe regulatory breaches mostly done by asset management firms, and consequently result in less severe sanctions.

Keywords: Financial markets, regulation, fraud, information and market efficiency, history, listed companies, asset management firms

JEL Classification: G14, G18, K42, N24

Suggested Citation

de Batz, Laure, Lessons from More than a Decade-Long History of Sanction in France (October 01, 2017). LabEx ReFi Working Paper Series No. 2017-11. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100023

Laure De Batz (Contact Author)

Institute of Economic Studies ( email )

Opletalova 26
Praha 1
Czech Republic

Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES) - LabEx Refi ( email )

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

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