Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-002

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-007

27 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2018 Last revised: 8 Feb 2018

See all articles by Riccardo Ghidoni

Riccardo Ghidoni

Tilburg University - Department of Economics

Blair Llewellyn Cleave

University of Melbourne - Centre for Actuarial Studies

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: January 10, 2018

Abstract

This paper focuses on social dilemma games where players may or may not meet the same partner again in the future. In line with the notion that contagion of cooperation is more likely the higher the likelihood of being re-matched with the same partner in the future, both a novel experiment and a meta-study document higher cooperation rates if this likelihood is sufficiently high.

Keywords: cooperation, contagion, matching protocol, laboratory experiment, meta-study

JEL Classification: C70, C90, D70

Suggested Citation

Ghidoni, Riccardo and Cleave, Blair Llewellyn and Suetens, S., Perfect and Imperfect Strangers in Social Dilemmas (January 10, 2018). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2018-002; TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100148

Riccardo Ghidoni (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Blair Llewellyn Cleave

University of Melbourne - Centre for Actuarial Studies ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

S. Suetens

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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