Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards

Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics Working Paper No. 44

30 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2018 Last revised: 14 May 2019

See all articles by Theo Nyreröd

Theo Nyreröd

EconAnalysis AB

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2017

Abstract

Whistleblower rewards have been used extensively in the US to limit procurement fraud and tax evasion, and their use has been extended to fight financial fraud after the recent financial crisis. There is currently a debate on their possible introduction in Europe, but authorities there appear considerably less enthusiastic than their US counterparts. While it is important that these tools are scrutinized in a lively democratic debate, many things have been written – even by important institutional players – that have no empirical backing or that are in open contrast to the available evidence from independent research. In this paper we review some of the most debated issues regarding the potential benefits and costs of financial incentives for whistleblowers, while trying to separate existing evidence from conjectures with no empirical support, and myths in contrast to available evidence.

Keywords: Whistleblowing, Rewards, Financial Fraud, Corruption

JEL Classification: G38, K42

Suggested Citation

Nyreröd, Theo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Myths and Numbers on Whistleblower Rewards (December 1, 2017). Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics Working Paper No. 44. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100754

Theo Nyreröd (Contact Author)

EconAnalysis AB ( email )

Sweden

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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