When Do the Innocent Plead Guilty?

27 Pages Posted: 19 Jan 2018

See all articles by Alex Lundberg

Alex Lundberg

West Virginia University - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 12, 2018

Abstract

The implications of a strategic model of plea bargaining are threefold. First, prosecutors induce the innocent to plead guilty when trial costs are high. Second, plea bargaining unequivocally increases wrongful convictions. Lastly, police share an important role in minimizing wrongful convictions. Law enforcement cannot rely on prosecutors to sort the guilty from the innocent.

Keywords: plea bargain, wrongful conviction, prosecutor behavior

JEL Classification: K10, K14, K40

Suggested Citation

Lundberg, Alexander, When Do the Innocent Plead Guilty? (January 12, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3100845

Alexander Lundberg (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

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