Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

54 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2018

See all articles by Francesco Decarolis

Francesco Decarolis

Boston University; Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Leonardo M. Giuffrida

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: January 2018

Abstract

Does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.

Suggested Citation

Decarolis, Francesco and Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria and Iossa, Elisabetta and Mollisi, Vincenzo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes (January 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24201. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102019

Francesco Decarolis (Contact Author)

Boston University ( email )

595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

HOME PAGE: http://people.bu.edu/fdc/

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

Leonardo Maria Giuffrida

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

L 7, 1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, 00133
Italy

IEFE Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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