Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution Building in Europe

27 Pages Posted: 14 May 2002

See all articles by Henry Farrell

Henry Farrell

Max-Planck Project Group

Adrienne Heritier

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

Current approaches examining the effect of institutions on policy processes have difficulty in explaining the results of the legislative process of codecision between European Parliament and Council within the European Union. The formal Treaty changes which gave rise to codecision have in turn given rise to a plethora of informal institutions, in a process which is difficult to understand using dominant modes of analysis. This article provides a framework for analyzing the relationship between formal and informal institutions, showing how the two may be recursively related. Formal institutional change at a particular moment in time may give rise to informal institutions, which in turn may affect the negotiation of future formal institutions. The article applies this framework to the codecision process, showing how the codecision procedure has led to the creation of informal institutions and modes of decision making, which in turn have affected subsequent Treaty negotiations. Through strategic use of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, Parliament has been successful in advancing its interests over time, and increasing its role in the legislative process.

Suggested Citation

Farrell, Henry and Heritier, Adrienne, Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution Building in Europe (2002). Max-Planck Project Group Preprint No. 2002/2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=310204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310204

Henry Farrell (Contact Author)

Max-Planck Project Group ( email )

Common Goods: Law, Politics and Economics
Poppelsdorfer Allee 45
D-53115 Bonn
Germany
(++49 228) 91416 - 27 (Phone)

Adrienne Heritier

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Poppelsdorfer Allee 45
Common Goods: Law, Politics and Economics
D-53115 Bonn
Germany
+049(0)228 914160 (Phone)
+049(0)228 9141655 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/herit.html

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

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50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

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