Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?
53 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2018 Last revised: 24 Jan 2019
Date Written: May 15, 2018
Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes but also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades off these two forces. As the platform develops, it optimally increases platform pre-screening intensity but decreases information provision to investors. Using novel investor-level data, we find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and this outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors. Our findings shed light on the optimal distribution of information production in this new lending model.
Keywords: Marketplace lending, screening, sophisticated investors, adverse selection
JEL Classification: G21, G23, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation