Information Asymmetries in the Hiring Process and the Risk of New Leader Dismissal: Insights from English Premier League Soccer Organizations

17 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2018

See all articles by Malay N. Desai

Malay N. Desai

University of Nottingham

Andy Lockett

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS)

David Paton

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS)

Date Written: January 2018

Abstract

Why are some new leaders dismissed more quickly than others? Adopting agency theory logic, the authors examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a potential candidate's competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of making poor hiring decisions and hence the risk of new leader dismissal. Employing duration analysis on a sample of 164 newly appointed leaders in the English premier league (1996–2014), the authors find that the risk of new leader dismissal is: (i) greater when the predecessor leader's exit was initiated by them rather than by the board; (ii) greater when following a longer‐tenured predecessor; and (iii) lower for outside successions compared with inside successions.

Suggested Citation

Desai, Malay N. and Lockett, Andy and Paton, David, Information Asymmetries in the Hiring Process and the Risk of New Leader Dismissal: Insights from English Premier League Soccer Organizations (January 2018). British Journal of Management, Vol. 29, Issue 1, pp. 26-42, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104174 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12210

Malay N. Desai (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Andy Lockett

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS) ( email )

Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Road
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

David Paton

Nottingham University Business School (NUBS) ( email )

Jubilee Campus
Wollaton Road
Nottingham NG8 1BB
United Kingdom
+44 0 115 8466601 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
181
PlumX Metrics