Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access

25 Pages Posted: 2 May 2002

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Will J. Martin

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of 'market access', emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.

Keywords: Expected costs of protection, commercial policy uncertainty, market access, WTO tariff bindings

JEL Classification: F10, F13, F17

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Martin, William J., Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access (April 2002). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3294. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=310440

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

William J. Martin

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

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