Intel and the Rebirth of the Economic Approach to EU Competition Law

International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law - IIC, Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2018 Last revised: 25 Mar 2018

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Mariateresa Maggiolino

Bocconi University - Department of Legal Studies; Ask Research Center

Date Written: January 18, 2018

Abstract

The Intel ruling will significantly affect EU competition law. It confirms that there cannot be per se violations of Article 102 TFEU and that, once the Commission follows a specific test in assessing the anticompetitive nature of a unilateral conduct, the reviewing courts cannot overlook that test. In addition, Intel gives some hints as to the rules governing the burden and the standard of proof that should be applied to show that monopolistic behaviors are anticompetitive.

Keywords: Antitrust; Intel; Effect-based Approach; As-Efficient-Competitor Test

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L41

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe and Maggiolino, Mariateresa, Intel and the Rebirth of the Economic Approach to EU Competition Law (January 18, 2018). International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law - IIC, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104850 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3104850

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

Mariateresa Maggiolino

Bocconi University - Department of Legal Studies ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Ask Research Center ( email )

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Milan, 20136
Italy

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