Bargaining and Competition Revisited

Brown University, Economics Working Paper No. 2002-14

13 Pages Posted: 24 May 2002

See all articles by Roberto Serrano

Roberto Serrano

Brown University

Takashi Kunimoto

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).

Keywords: Bargaining, competition, exchange, decentralization

JEL Classification: D51, D41, C78

Suggested Citation

Serrano, Roberto and Kunimoto, Takashi, Bargaining and Competition Revisited (May 2002). Brown University, Economics Working Paper No. 2002-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=310582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310582

Roberto Serrano

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Takashi Kunimoto (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-2735 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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