Bargaining and Competition Revisited
Brown University, Economics Working Paper No. 2002-14
13 Pages Posted: 24 May 2002
Date Written: May 2002
We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).
Keywords: Bargaining, competition, exchange, decentralization
JEL Classification: D51, D41, C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Serrano, Roberto and Kunimoto, Takashi, Bargaining and Competition Revisited (May 2002). Brown University, Economics Working Paper No. 2002-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=310582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.310582
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