Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?

12 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2018

See all articles by Martin Gassebner

Martin Gassebner

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO); Leibniz Universit├Ąt Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management

Date Written: December 05, 2017

Abstract

While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.

Keywords: trade policy, development, GSP, United Nations General Assembly

JEL Classification: F130, F530, O190, O240

Suggested Citation

Gassebner, Martin and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik and Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik, Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences? (December 05, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107487

Martin Gassebner

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute ( email )

Weinbergstrasse 35
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/chair/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan (Contact Author)

Leibniz Universit├Ąt Hannover - Faculty of Economics and Management ( email )

Koenigsworther Platz 1
Hannover, 30167
Germany

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

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