Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

53 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2018

See all articles by Mehmet Ekmekci

Mehmet Ekmekci

Boston College - Department of Economics

Stephan Lauermann

University of Bonn - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 1, 2016

Abstract

We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state a and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal about the unknown state but does not learn the size of the electorate. In contrast to existing results for large elections, there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails: As the voter recruitment cost vanishes, the organizer can ensure that policy a is implemented with high probability independently of the state.

Suggested Citation

Ekmekci, Mehmet and Lauermann, Stephan, Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation (December 1, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3108364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3108364

Mehmet Ekmekci

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

United States

Stephan Lauermann (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Department of Economics ( email )

Bonn
Germany

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