Corporate Governance of Insurance Firms after Solvency II

in “Insurance Regulation in the European Union: Solvency II and Beyond”, edited by P. Marano – M. Siri, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017

Goethe University - International Center for Insurance Regulation - Working Paper Series No. 27/2017

39 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2018

See all articles by Michele Siri

Michele Siri

University of Genoa - Law School

Date Written: July 10, 2017

Abstract

Under Solvency II, corporate governance requirements are a complementary, but nonetheless essential, element to build a sound regulatory framework for insurance undertakings, also to address risks not specifically mitigated by the sole solvency capital requirements. After recalling the provisions of the Second Pillar concerning the system of governance, the paper highlights the emerging regulatory trends in the corporate governance of insurance firms. Among others things, it signals the exceptional extension of the duties and responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, far beyond the traditional role of both monitoring the chief executive officer, and assessing the overall direction and strategy of the business. However, a better risk governance is not necessarily built on narrow rule-based approaches to corporate governance.

Keywords: Insurance, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Culture, Risk Management, Internal Controls, Proportionality, Regulation, EIOPA, Solvency, Guidelines, ORSA, Own Risk Self Assessment

JEL Classification: K22, G38

Suggested Citation

Siri, Michele, Corporate Governance of Insurance Firms after Solvency II (July 10, 2017). in “Insurance Regulation in the European Union: Solvency II and Beyond”, edited by P. Marano – M. Siri, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017; Goethe University - International Center for Insurance Regulation - Working Paper Series No. 27/2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3108439

Michele Siri (Contact Author)

University of Genoa - Law School ( email )

Via Balbi, 22
16126 Genova
Italy

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