Reflections on the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal
15 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2018 Last revised: 17 Jun 2018
Date Written: January 25, 2018
In Germany the Volkswagen Diesel scandal is originally a market failure because the harm from vehicle emissions to public health and to the environment is neither internalized by car producers nor by car drivers. This market failure is neither corrected by public regulation nor by civil liability. There is regulatory failure because the control of NOx emissions by the regulatory agency (Kraftfahrtbundesamt) was lenient. There is also corporate governance failure within Volkswagen where the fraud of installing a manipulative software happened. And there is dysfunctional law, which does not allow the bundling of similar interests of car owners due to industrial lobbying. It seems that the civil courts kept their full independence in this matter. Courts of lower instance in their large majority decided that owners should get their money back. However so far less than 50.000 out of 2.4 million car owners took action against Volkswagen or car dealers. The others shy away from risky litigation. The procedures take much time. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) will take a decision until the end of 2018, which would end legal uncertainty. After that date all limitation periods will expire. The strong signal of a Supreme Court decision will most probably be sent only after the end of the limitation period. For Volkswagen the consequence would then probably be that it has to pay some hundred million Euros as compared with more than 14 billion Euros if all affected would have made their claim.
Since the 1990s, European legislators have given an additional boost to modern turbocharged direct injection diesel engines by applying laxer standards for NOx emissions and particulate matter than to gasoline cars. Miravete et al. (2017) estimate that this special treatment for diesel vehicles in Europe, combined with preferential fuel taxes for diesel, corresponds to an implicit import tariff of two to three times the official rate with respect to non-diesel car exporters, such as the USA and Japan. This policy was well perceived by European car producers with their comparatively large share of diesel cars and made it easier for the politicians to comply with European CO2 emission standards. The converse public choice constellation holds for the US, where politicians have little interest in supporting diesel cars. On one hand, reduction of CO2 emissions has never been of highest priority in the USA, probably because the relevant stakeholders have been afraid of losing competitiveness with respect to emerging market economies like China and India. On the other hand, since many decades, politicians have been facing strong pressure by large parts of the urban population suffering from ambient air pollution. Thus, it makes no wonder that US car manufacturers are not familiar with modern diesel technology, and the share of diesel passenger cars remains low, NOx emission standards are high and law enforcement stricter.
The interest of car manufacturers carries enormous weight in German politics and must be balanced through permanent and increasing pressure by the victims of emission standard infringements. The (inefficient) bias in favor of car producers’ interests could be mitigated by shifting the competence for type approval from the Federal Ministry of Transport, which is tightly connected to the car industry, to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, which arguably has a stronger commitment to protecting air quality. Moreover, the removal of legal obstacles to coordinated court actions by affected car owners would improve their chance to enforce their interests via civil liability actions.
Keywords: Volkswagen Diesel Scandal, Regulation, Civil Liability, Class Action
JEL Classification: K12, K13, K23, L
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