The Divided Executive

34 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2018 Last revised: 27 Feb 2018

See all articles by Laurence Claus

Laurence Claus

University of San Diego School of Law

Date Written: January 26, 2018

Abstract

Article II’s apparent provision for a unitary executive is at odds with a mature understanding of what makes the separation of powers constitutionally valuable. From Montesquieu to Brandeis, jurists theorizing separation of powers have characterized its purpose as primarily to promote liberty and the rule of law. Two centuries of constitutional experience lets us now see more clearly that liberty and the rule of law are promoted by checks and balances that prevent individual actors, including the President, from conclusively determining the reach of their own powers. Dividing the executive may further promote the liberty and rule-of-law goals of the Constitution’s existing checks and balances. This article, written for a symposium at Duke University School of Law entitled An Even More Perfect Union: Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, further develops and deepens the case made in existing scholarship for dividing the American national executive, and in particular for constitutionally securing the independence of the Attorney General.

Keywords: separation of powers, checks and balances, attorney general, constitutional amendment, independent prosecutor, one-House veto, Chadha, Montesquieu, Madison, impeachment, independent counsel

Suggested Citation

Claus, Laurence, The Divided Executive (January 26, 2018). San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 18-333. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3110496 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110496

Laurence Claus (Contact Author)

University of San Diego School of Law ( email )

5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
619-260-5933 (Phone)
619-260-4180 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
97
Abstract Views
622
rank
279,073
PlumX Metrics