Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative Enforcement

18 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2018 Last revised: 29 Jan 2018

See all articles by Heidi Mandanis Schooner

Heidi Mandanis Schooner

Catholic University of America (CUA) - Columbus School of Law

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Traditional mechanisms for monitoring management behavior in the form of shareholder derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty are not well suited to the task of monitoring bank managers’ effectiveness in ensuring banks’ safety and soundness. Moreover, the power of bank regulators to address lax management through administrative enforcement powers is limited, especially when evaluated in the context of Congress’ vision, as reflected in the passage of Dodd-Frank, of enhanced supervision of large banks. In particular, the fact that negligent or grossly negligent behavior does not implicate the agencies’ power to remove a bank director undermines Dodd-Frank’s system of enhanced supervision of large banks. This article considers big bank director liability in the context of the enhanced supervisory regime and uses the JPMorgan London Whale debacle to illustrate the importance of strong administrative enforcement.

Keywords: Bank Regulation, Bank Supervision, Administrative Enforcement, London Whale

JEL Classification: K2

Suggested Citation

Schooner, Heidi Mandanis, Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative Enforcement (2017). Alabama Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, 2017, CUA Columbus School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 973, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3110956

Heidi Mandanis Schooner (Contact Author)

Catholic University of America (CUA) - Columbus School of Law ( email )

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