Voting in Hiring Committees: Which 'Almost' Rule is Optimal?

37 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2018

See all articles by Eyal Baharad

Eyal Baharad

University of Haifa - Department of Economics; Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Leif Danziger

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.

Keywords: committee decisions, scoring rules, "almost" voting rules

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Baharad, Eyal and Danziger, Leif, Voting in Hiring Committees: Which 'Almost' Rule is Optimal?. IZA Discussion Paper No. 11287, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111160

Eyal Baharad (Contact Author)

University of Haifa - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Caramel
Haifa 31905
Israel
972 4 824 9585 (Phone)
972 4 824 0059 (Fax)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

Leif Danziger

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
8-6472295 (Phone)
8-6472941 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.bgu.ac.il/facultym/danziger/main.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
6
Abstract Views
136
PlumX Metrics