What Determined 2015 TPA Voting Pattern?: The Role of Trade Negotiating Objectives

40 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2018

See all articles by Yeo Joon Yoon

Yeo Joon Yoon

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Woong Lee

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Date Written: December 27, 2017

Abstract

This paper analyzes 2015-TPA voting patterns in the Congress in the context of the trade negotiating objectives. By setting the trade negotiating objectives, the Congress lays out important trade agenda that the Administration is expected to address when it is negotiating trade deals with foreign countries. Therefore setting the objectives is subject of heated debates in the Congress and an important part of TPA. LPM and probit models are used to evaluate the importance of each trade negotiating objectives in 2015-TPA voting decisions. It turns out that the objective on promoting U.S. agricultural exports by reducing unfair trade barriers positively affected the voting decision in favor of the TPA. The objective on enforcing strong labor standards on trade partners also had significant impacts. One other notable result is that how much each congressional region export to China was also an important determinant. This variable is meant to capture several negotiating objectives as well as growing worries of large trade deficits with China. This study documents important issues that U.S. Congress is concerned about in making conducting and implementing trade policies. It may provide insights into the future course of U.S. trade policy and trade deals such as renegotiation of NAFTA and Korea-US FTA.

Keywords: Trade Agreements, Trade Promotion Authority, Voting

JEL Classification: F10, D72

Suggested Citation

Yoon, Yeo Joon and Lee, Woong, What Determined 2015 TPA Voting Pattern?: The Role of Trade Negotiating Objectives (December 27, 2017). KIEP Research Paper. Working paper 17-08, ISBN: 978-89-322-4274-3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3112146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3112146

Yeo Joon Yoon (Contact Author)

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy ( email )

[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Compl
Seoul, 370
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Woong Lee

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ( email )

270 Imun-dong Dongdaemun-gu
Seoul, 130-791
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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