The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?

M. Adams et al. (eds.) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp.419-444).

University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 5/2018

21 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2018 Last revised: 10 Apr 2018

See all articles by Dimitry Kochenov

Dimitry Kochenov

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest; CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna

Date Written: January 29, 2018

Abstract

The Union’s vulnerability in the domain of values, including, but not confined to the rule of law, which is more and more coming to light, is caused by a far-reaching systemic problem of the European Union’s design and also by the modalities of its day-to-day functioning, both falling short of upholding the much-restated rule of law ideal for the Union. Although numerous scholarly propositions have been made as to how to deal with the rule of law deficiencies in the EU to circumvent the perceived difficulties of Article 7 deployment (these are normally formulated in general terms, but, usually for good reasons, have specific member state(s) in mind), the depth of the problem seems to be defying easy solutions, implying the need to move beyond enforcement-dominated thinking in our analysis.

Keywords: EU Rule of Law, enforcement, values, Article 7, Poland, Hungary

Suggested Citation

Kochenov, Dimitry and Kochenov, Dimitry, The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design? (January 29, 2018). M. Adams et al. (eds.) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism (Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp.419-444)., University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 5/2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3112189

Dimitry Kochenov (Contact Author)

CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest ( email )

Nador utca 9
Budapest, H-1051
Hungary

CEU Department of Legal Studies, Vienna ( email )

Quellenstraße 51
Vienna, 1100
Austria

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