Download This PaperDynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions: Technical Appendix
UCLA Department of Economics Working Paper No. 819
63 Pages Posted: 29 May 2002
Date Written: April 2002
Abstract
In our paper "Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income and Hidden Actions," we develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent models with hidden income and hidden actions. This appendix provides the detailed derivations of all recursive formulations presented in the paper, as well as proofs for all propositions.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Public Reserves, Mechanism Design, Dynamic Contracts
JEL Classification: C63, C73, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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