Who Bears the Burden of Bribery? Evidence from Public Service Delivery in Kenya

20 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2018

See all articles by Michael Mbate

Michael Mbate

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: March 2018

Abstract

This article empirically examines how an individual's economic, social and political capital affects their propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an individual‐level survey on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, but substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic corruption are strong and effective. The results also show that the incidence of bribery decreases when social capital is high but increases when political networks are prevalent. These findings support the need to combine anti‐corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies and social policies in order to foster equity in public services provision in Kenya.

Keywords: accountability, bureaucratic behaviour, corruption, public service delivery

Suggested Citation

Mbate, Michael, Who Bears the Burden of Bribery? Evidence from Public Service Delivery in Kenya (March 2018). Development Policy Review, Vol. 36, pp. O321-O340, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3116487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12311

Michael Mbate (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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