A Mechanism Design Approach to Vendor Managed Inventory

Management Science, Forthcoming

52 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2018 Last revised: 10 May 2019

See all articles by Bharadwaj Kadiyala

Bharadwaj Kadiyala

University of Utah - Department of Operations and Information Systems

Özalp Özer

Jindal School of Management - The University of Texas at Dallas

Alain Bensoussan

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management; Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Faculty of Business; Ajou University

Date Written: February 4, 2018

Abstract

This paper studies an inventory management problem faced by an upstream supplier who is in a collaborative agreement, such as vendor managed inventory (VMI), with a retailer. A VMI partnership provides the supplier an opportunity to manage inventory for the supply chain, in exchange for point-of-sales (POS) and inventory level information from the retailer. However, retailers typically posses superior local market information and, as has been the case in recent years, are able to capture and analyze customer purchasing behavior beyond the traditional POS data. Such analyses provide the retailer, access to market signals that are otherwise, hard to capture using POS information. We demonstrate and quantify the implication of the fi nancial obligations of each party in VMI that renders communication of such important market signals as non-credible. To help institute a sound VMI collaboration, we propose a learn-and-screen dynamic inventory mechanism for the supplier to effectively manage inventory and information in the supply chain. The proposed mechanism combines the ability of the supplier to learn about market conditions from POS data (over multiple selling periods) and to dynamically determine when to screen the retailer and acquire his private demand information. Inventory decisions in the proposed mechanism serve a strategic purpose in addition to their classic role of satisfying customer demand. We show that our proposed dynamic mechanism signi cantly improves the supplier's expected pro t and increases the efficiency of the overall supply chain operations under a VMI agreement. In addition, we determine the market conditions in which a strategic approach to VMI results in signi cant pro t improvements for both rms, in particular, when the retailer has high market power (i.e., when the supplier highly depends on the retailer) and when the supplier has relatively less knowledge about the end customer/market compared to the retailer.

Keywords: Value of information sharing, vendor managed inventory, incentives of information sharing, Bayesian inventory management, mechanism design, censored demand

Suggested Citation

Kadiyala, Bharadwaj and Özer, Özalp and Bensoussan, Alain, A Mechanism Design Approach to Vendor Managed Inventory (February 4, 2018). Management Science, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117872 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3117872

Bharadwaj Kadiyala

University of Utah - Department of Operations and Information Systems ( email )

1645 E Campus Center Drive
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

Özalp Özer (Contact Author)

Jindal School of Management - The University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

Jindal School of Management
800 W. Campbell Road
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

Alain Bensoussan

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 West Campbell Rd
SM 30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States
9728836117 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.utdallas.edu/~axb046100/

Hong Kong Polytechnic University - Faculty of Business

Dept SEEM
Systems Engr * Engr Mgmt
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

Ajou University ( email )

Ajou
France

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