Edging Toward ‘Reasonably’ Good Corporate Governance

Forthcoming in Philosophy of Management (Springer, ISSN 1740-3812); doi: 10.1007/s40926-017-0083-9

26 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2018

Date Written: February 6, 2018

Abstract

Over four decades, research and policy have created layers of understandings in the quest for “good” corporate governance. The corporate excesses of the 1970s sparked a search for market mechanisms and disclosure to empower shareholders. The UK-focused problems of the 1990s prompted boardcentric, structural approaches, while the fall of Enron and many other companies in the early 2000s heightened emphasis on director independence and professionalism. With the financial crisis of 2007-09, however, came a turn in some policy approaches and in academic literature seeking a different way forward. This paper explores those four phases and the discourse each develops and then links each to assumptions about accountability and cognition. After the financial crisis came pointers n policy and practice away from narrow, rationalist prescriptions and toward what the philosopher Stephen Toulmin calls “reasonableness”. Acknowledging that heightens awareness of complexity and interdependence in corporate governance practice. The paper then articulates a research agenda concerning what “reasonably” good corporate governance might entail.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Boards of Directors, Investors, Rationality, Reasonableness

JEL Classification: M10, G34, L20

Suggested Citation

Nordberg, Donald, Edging Toward ‘Reasonably’ Good Corporate Governance (February 6, 2018). Forthcoming in Philosophy of Management (Springer, ISSN 1740-3812); doi: 10.1007/s40926-017-0083-9, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3118824

Donald Nordberg (Contact Author)

Bournemouth University ( email )

Executive Business Centre, 89 Holdenhurst Road,
Bournemouth, BH8 8EB
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://staffprofiles.bournemouth.ac.uk/display/dnordberg

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