Selective Distribution and Online Marketplace Restrictions Under EU Competition Rules after Coty Prestige

European Competition Journal 2018 (Forthcoming)

22 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2018

See all articles by Giuseppe Colangelo

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Valerio Torti

LUISS University of Rome; European University of Rome

Date Written: February 6, 2018

Abstract

Given the impressive growth of Internet shopping, one may wonder how the antitrust rules on selective distribution systems might fit in the context of online sales. Indeed, the online sales phenomenon has attracted significant attention in recent years in several Member States, mainly by the question on the extent to which restrictions limiting the ability of retailers to sell via online marketplaces are compatible with competition rules. No wonder the Coty Prestige judgment is so much-awaited. The ruling is expected to shape the future of EU e-commerce affecting online markets, the luxury industry and Internet platforms.

Keywords: selective distribution; vertical restraints; luxury goods; e-commerce; marketplace restrictions; third-party platforms

JEL Classification: K21; L21; L42

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Giuseppe and Torti, Valerio, Selective Distribution and Online Marketplace Restrictions Under EU Competition Rules after Coty Prestige (February 6, 2018). European Competition Journal 2018 (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119129

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

Valerio Torti

LUISS University of Rome; European University of Rome ( email )

Rome, 00100
Italy

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