Investor Ideology

80 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2018 Last revised: 28 Sep 2019

See all articles by Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Tao Li

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Enrichetta Ravina

Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Howard Rosenthal

New York University

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 3, 2019

Abstract

We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. “Money conscious” investors appear on the right. The proxy adviser ISS makes voting recommendations that place it center, to the left of most mutual funds. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management disciplinarian investors, the proxy adviser Glass-Lewis among them, pitted against more management friendly ones.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Proxy Voting, Ideology, Spatial Model

JEL Classification: G23, G30, D72, C80

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Li, Tao and Ravina, Enrichetta and Rosenthal, Howard, Investor Ideology (September 3, 2019). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-21; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 557/2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119935

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Tao Li

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

Warrington College of Business
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States

HOME PAGE: http://warrington.ufl.edu/contact/profile.asp?WEBID=7628

Enrichetta Ravina

Kellogg School of Management ( email )

Evanston, IL 60208
United States
8474676872 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/eravina/home

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Howard Rosenthal

New York University ( email )

19 W 4th St
New York, NY New York 10012
United States
4155199591 (Phone)
4155199591 (Fax)

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