Investor Ideology

80 Pages Posted: 14 Feb 2018 Last revised: 28 Sep 2019

See all articles by Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Tao Li

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration

Enrichetta Ravina

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Howard Rosenthal

New York University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 3, 2019

Abstract

We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. “Money conscious” investors appear on the right. The proxy adviser ISS makes voting recommendations that place it center, to the left of most mutual funds. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management disciplinarian investors, the proxy adviser Glass-Lewis among them, pitted against more management friendly ones.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Proxy Voting, Ideology, Spatial Model

JEL Classification: G23, G30, D72, C80

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Li, Tao and Ravina, Enrichetta and Rosenthal, Howard, Investor Ideology (September 3, 2019). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-21, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 557/2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119935 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119935

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Tao Li

University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration ( email )

308 Stuzin Hall
Gainesville, FL 32601
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/tao-li/

Enrichetta Ravina

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/eravina/research

Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

33 Great Sutton Street
London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
Brussels
Belgium

Howard Rosenthal

New York University ( email )

19 W 4th St
New York, NY New York 10012
United States
4155199591 (Phone)
4155199591 (Fax)

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