Never Change a Winning Team: An Analysis of Hazard Rates in the NBA

Greifswald Economics Working Paper No. 3/02

32 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2002  

Alexander Dilger

University of Münster

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

We estimate Cox models to determine proportional hazard rates in professional basketball, concerning leaving the league or changing the team by using a database covering all players of the NBA in the 90's. We predict and confirm that league-hazards depend on a player's performance. A team-switch, however, cannot depend on low performance itself because there has to be a team willing to accept the (new) player. Accordingly we find that a good scoring performance and an intense use of a player reduces the probability of a team-switch, whereas high salaries or non-scoring performance do not.

Keywords: Cox model, hazard rates, matching, NBA, sports economics, turnover

JEL Classification: C41, J63, L83, M51

Suggested Citation

Dilger, Alexander, Never Change a Winning Team: An Analysis of Hazard Rates in the NBA (May 2002). Greifswald Economics Working Paper No. 3/02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=312001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.312001

Alexander Dilger (Contact Author)

University of Münster ( email )

Institute for Organisational Economics
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Münster, D-48151
Germany
+49-251-83-25330 (Phone)
+49-251-83-28429 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/io/en/organisation/Dilger.html

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