The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment

43 Pages Posted: 16 May 2002

See all articles by Rafael Lalive

Rafael Lalive

University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Jan C. van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics

Josef Zweimüller

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

This Paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labour market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter the duration of unemployment. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.

Keywords: Unemployment duration, benefit sanctions, monitoring

JEL Classification: J64, J65, J68

Suggested Citation

Lalive, Rafael and van Ours, Jan C. and Zweimueller, Josef, The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (April 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=312007

Rafael Lalive (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - Department of Economics (DEEP) ( email )

BFSH1
Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Jan C. Van Ours

Tilburg University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2880 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

University of Melbourne - Department of Economics ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia

Josef Zweimueller

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+411 634 3724 (Phone)
+411 634 4907 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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