An Examination of Dinstein's Thesis of Defensive Armed Reprisals: An Expression of Legitimate Self-Defence or an Abuse of Power?

2(2) Edinburgh Student Law Review, 2014

17 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2018

See all articles by Michaela S. Halpern

Michaela S. Halpern

Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Harry Radziner School of Law; Queen Mary University of London, Centre for Commercial Law Studies

Date Written: June 3, 2014

Abstract

The "rules" of international law originally contemplated state actors, interacting among one another; the modern world, and modern warfare, now goes beyond state actors and involves a state responding to attacks on its integrity, if not existence, from an array of forces that are themselves neither state nor nation based, but supranational or ultranational groups operating from sanctuary within nation states. The law needs to adapt to reality and Dr. Yoram Dinstein gives one solution - defensive armed reprisals that can be legally executed under both Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. This article will assess Dinstein's thesis, ultimately concluding that it offers an acceptable balance between the competing interests which so often conflict within this area of international law.

Keywords: International Law; Armed Conflict; International Humanitarian Law; Law of War; Self Defense; State Sovereignty; Aggression; National Security; Customary International Law

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Halpern, Michaela S., An Examination of Dinstein's Thesis of Defensive Armed Reprisals: An Expression of Legitimate Self-Defence or an Abuse of Power? (June 3, 2014). 2(2) Edinburgh Student Law Review, 2014 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3120954

Michaela S. Halpern (Contact Author)

Reichman University - Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Harry Radziner School of Law ( email )

Israel

Queen Mary University of London, Centre for Commercial Law Studies ( email )

67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London
United Kingdom

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