Shareholder Activism in REITs

Real Estate Economics, Forthcoming

43 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2018 Last revised: 25 Mar 2018

See all articles by David H. Downs

David H. Downs

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - Department of Finance, Insurance & Real Estate; The Kornblau Institute

Miroslava Straska

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business

Date Written: March 15, 2018

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non-REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006-2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non-EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non-EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.

Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Firm Value, REITs, Corporate Control

JEL Classification: G14, G23, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Downs, David H. and Straska, Miroslava and Waller, H. Gregory, Shareholder Activism in REITs (March 15, 2018). Real Estate Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121187 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3121187

David H. Downs (Contact Author)

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - Department of Finance, Insurance & Real Estate ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

The Kornblau Institute ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

Miroslava Straska

Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) - School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23284-4000
United States

H. Gregory Waller

Virginia Commonwealth University School of Business ( email )

Richmond, VA 23226
United States

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