Shareholder Activism in REITs

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non-REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006-2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non-EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non-EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.

Keywords: Shareholder Activism, Firm Value, REITs, Corporate Control

JEL Classification: G14, G23, G32, G34