On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
Posted: 27 Jun 2002
This short paper shows that in an affiliated value setting one more bidder at the auction stage need not induce a higher expected welfare in either ascending price or second price auctions. We highlight the roles of asymmetries between bidders and of the multidimensional character of the private information in deriving this result.
Keywords: auctions, affiliated value, asymmetries, competition, efficiency
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Compte, Olivier and Jehiel, Philippe, On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=312234
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