The Power of Money. The Consequences of Electing a Donor Funded Politician

48 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2018 Last revised: 22 Jul 2018

See all articles by Nelson A. Ruiz

Nelson A. Ruiz

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); ETH-Zurich

Date Written: March 8, 2017

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of electing donor-funded politicians and campaign finance-limits using a novel dataset that uniquely links campaign donors and recipients of public contracts during a mayor's incumbency period in Colombia. Evidence shows that electing a donor-funded politician more than doubles the probability of donors receiving contracts and incumbents receiving disciplinary sanctions. Donor contracts are assigned under a minimum-value modality where there is less screening, and have a higher price compared to similar non-donor contracts. Campaign limits, lead to lower participation of donor-funding in campaigns, and as a result reduce the effect of favoring donors with contracts.

Keywords: Campaign Finance, Political Selection, Corruption, Public Procurement, Campaign Limits

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D02

Suggested Citation

Ruiz, Nelson, The Power of Money. The Consequences of Electing a Donor Funded Politician (March 8, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123592 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3123592

Nelson Ruiz (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

ETH-Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
132
rank
204,524
Abstract Views
511
PlumX Metrics