Antitrust as Corporate Governance

61 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2018

See all articles by Ramsi Woodcock

Ramsi Woodcock

University of Kentucky College of Law

Date Written: September 25, 2017

Abstract

Consumers have been left out of the great debate over the mission of the firm, in which advocates of shareholder value maximization face off against advocates of corporate social responsibility, who would allow management leeway to allocate profits to groups other than shareholders, such as workers. The consumer welfare standard adopted by antitrust law in the 1970s should be read to require that the firm allocate its profits neither to shareholders nor to workers, but rather strive to have no profits at all, by charging the lowest possible prices for the best quality products. Such a profit minimization requirement, which, as federal law, would bind all state-level corporate law regimes, would preserve incentives for businesses to perform efficiently because any incentive payments necessary for efficiency count as costs, not profits, and could therefore be retained by firms.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Shareholder Primacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Consumer Welfare, Antitrust, Agency Theory, Dodge v. Ford

JEL Classification: L21, L40

Suggested Citation

Woodcock, Ramsi, Antitrust as Corporate Governance (September 25, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123985 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3123985

Ramsi Woodcock (Contact Author)

University of Kentucky College of Law ( email )

620 S. Limestone Street
Lexington, KY 40506-0048
United States

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