Framing, Information, and Welfare

44 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2018 Last revised: 12 Jun 2020

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 19, 2020


Consumers often face an overwhelming amount of information when deciding between products, and one of the primary policymaking tools available to improve their informativeness is the framing of this information. We introduce a general theoretical approach that characterizes when one frame is revealed to provide robustly higher welfare than another. Because it is testable, adaptable, and both necessary and sufficient, our condition determines both whether frames are robustly welfare ranked in a particular data set and the overall proportion of data sets in which frames can be so ranked.

Keywords: Framing effects, behavioral welfare economics, revealed preferences, incomplete information

Suggested Citation

Caplin, Andrew and Martin, Daniel, Framing, Information, and Welfare (May 19, 2020). Available at SSRN: or

Andrew Caplin

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel Martin (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics