Welfare and Incentives in Partitioned School Choice Markets

18 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2018

Date Written: February 15, 2018

Abstract

Divided enrollment systems cause school assignments to be unfair and wasteful. Iterative version of the student-optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), proposed by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), achieves individually rational and fair assignments in such partitioned school choice markets for any number of iteration. It also reaches a non-wasteful matching when iterated sufficiently many times. This paper examines the effects of partition structure of schools on students' welfare and incentives they face under I-SOSM. I find that when school partition gets coarser students' welfare weakly increases under I-SOSM for any number of iteration. I also show that under coarser school partitions I-SOSM becomes weakly less manipulable for students according to a criteria defined by Pathak and Sönmez (2013). These results suggest that when full integration is not possible keeping school partition as coarse as possible benefits students with respect to their welfare and incentives they face if stability is a concern for policymakers.

Keywords: divided enrollment, school partitions, school choice, fairness, non-wastefulness, manipulation

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D63

Suggested Citation

Turhan, Bertan, Welfare and Incentives in Partitioned School Choice Markets (February 15, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3124687

Bertan Turhan (Contact Author)

Iowa State University ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
371
PlumX Metrics