Social Relations in the Workplace: A 'Linked Games' Approach

Stockholm School of Economics WPS76

Posted: 19 May 1998

See all articles by Giancarlo Spagnolo

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: October 1995

Abstract

The paper analyzes how cooperation in a repeated social game may help to sustain cooperation in a "linked" repeated production game. We show that this may happen a) because of available "social capital," defined as the slack of punishment power present in the social repeated game; b) because, when agents' utility functions are strictly concave in the outcome of the two games, a simultaneous punishment in the linked games turns out to be a stronger threat than the sum of the independent punishments in the two component games; and c) because the linkage between two repeated games may generate transfers of "trust."

JEL Classification: C73, D23, D73, M12

Suggested Citation

Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Social Relations in the Workplace: A 'Linked Games' Approach (October 1995 ). Stockholm School of Economics WPS76, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125

Giancarlo Spagnolo (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
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HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
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University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

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Italy

EIEF ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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