The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference

58 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2018 Last revised: 8 May 2018

Jonathan R. Siegel

George Washington University Law School

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

Prominent figures in the legal world have recently attacked the doctrine of Chevron deference, suggesting that Chevron is unconstitutional because it interferes with a court’s duty to exercise “independent judgment” when interpreting statutes. This Article shows that Chevron’s critics are mistaken. Chevron deference, properly understood, does not prevent courts from interpreting statutes. An interpretation that concludes that a statute delegates power to an executive agency is still an interpretation. The power implicitly delegated to an agency by an ambiguous statute is not the power to interpret the statute, but the power to make a policy choice within the limits set by the possible meanings of the statute.

Suggested Citation

Siegel, Jonathan R., The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference (2018). 71 VAND. L. REV 937 (2018); GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-01; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2018-01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125081

Jonathan R. Siegel (Contact Author)

George Washington University Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7453 (Phone)
202-994-5614 (Fax)

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