The Possibility and Desirability of Economic Sanction: Rule of Law Conditionality Requirements Against Illiberal EU Member States

29 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2018

See all articles by Gábor Halmai

Gábor Halmai

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

The paper deals with the ways in which the European Union can and should cope with recent deviations from the shared values of rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights, especially in some of the new Member States in East-Central Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, but also elsewhere. The paper first discusses the traditional legal tools, like infrigment procedures, which seemed to be ineffective, including the Article 7 procedure, finally triggered against Poland. As all of these tools, as well as the EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law proved to be ineffective, suggestions were made to link receipt of EU cohesion funds to respect for democratic principles. The paper assesses the legal possibilities and effectiveness of economic sanctions, and concludes that EU law does not exclude such conditionality and it can be desirable for the protection of the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights in Members States, which are non-compliant with basic values of the EU.

Keywords: Rule of law; Illiberal Member States of the EU; Infringement procedure; Article 2 and 7 TEU; Value conditionality

Suggested Citation

Halmai, Gábor, The Possibility and Desirability of Economic Sanction: Rule of Law Conditionality Requirements Against Illiberal EU Member States (2018). EUI Department of Law Research Paper no. 2018/06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3126231 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126231

Gábor Halmai (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY
39-055-4686-401 (Phone)

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