A Social Heuristics Hypothesis for the Stag Hunt: Fast- and Slow-Thinking Hunters in the Lab

48 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2018

See all articles by Marianna Belloc

Marianna Belloc

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Economics

Ennio Bilancini

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi di Modena

Leonardo Boncinelli

University of Florence - Department of Economics and Management

Simone D’Alessandro

University of Pisa - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 23, 2018

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the role of intuitive versus deliberative thinking in stag hunt games. To do so we, first, provide a conceptual framework predicting that, under the assumption that stag is the ruling social convention in real life interactions, players who make their choices fast and intuitively, relying on social heuristics, choose stag more often than other players. Second, we run a lab experiment and use a time pressure treatment to induce fast and intuitive thinking. We find that: (i) players under the time pressure treatment are more likely to choose stag than individuals in the control group; (ii) individual choices under the time pressure treatment are less sensitive to the size of the basin of attraction of stag; (iii) these results are largely driven by less experienced participants. Overall, our findings provide support to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis applied to stag hunt interactions.

Keywords: social heuristics hypothesis, stag hunt, intuition, deliberation, lab experiments

JEL Classification: C910, D010

Suggested Citation

Belloc, Marianna and Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo and D’Alessandro, Simone, A Social Heuristics Hypothesis for the Stag Hunt: Fast- and Slow-Thinking Hunters in the Lab (January 23, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6824, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127353

Marianna Belloc (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome - Department of Economics ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano 9
Rome, 00161
Italy

Ennio Bilancini

Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi di Modena ( email )

Via Università 4
Modena, Modena 41121
Italy

Leonardo Boncinelli

University of Florence - Department of Economics and Management ( email )

Via delle Pandette, 9
Firenze, Florence 50127
Italy

Simone D’Alessandro

University of Pisa - Department of Economics ( email )

via Ridolfi 10
I-56100 Pisa, PI 56100
Italy

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