On the Democratic Weights of Nations

50 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2018

See all articles by Sascha Kurz

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth

Nicola Maaser

University of Bremen - Department of Economics

Stefan Napel

University of Bayreuth

Date Written: March 18, 2016


Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of differently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the ‘one person, one vote’ principle by demanding every individual’s influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis differs from previous ones by considering intervals of alternatives. New reasons lead to an old conclusion: weights should be proportional to the square root of constituency sizes if voter preferences are independent and identically distributed. This is knife-edged, however, in that preference polarization along constituency lines quickly calls for a Shapley value-based variation of simple proportionality.

Keywords: institutional design; two-tier voting; collective choice; Shapley value; pivot probability; equal representation; random order values

JEL Classification: D02; D63; D70; H77

Suggested Citation

Kurz, Sascha and Maaser, Nicola and Napel, Stefan, On the Democratic Weights of Nations (March 18, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128353 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128353

Sascha Kurz

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitätsstr. 30
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsmathematik
Bayreuth, Bavaria D-95440
+49 921 55 7353 (Phone)
+49 921 55 7352 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wm.uni-bayreuth.de/index.php?id=sascha

Nicola Maaser

University of Bremen - Department of Economics ( email )

Bremen, D-28334

Stefan Napel (Contact Author)

University of Bayreuth ( email )

Universitatsstr 30
Bayreuth, D-95447

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