Private Equity Buyouts: Anti- or Pro-Competitive?

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 1: 31–34, January 2018

6 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2018  

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Lars Persson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Joacim Tåg

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Date Written: February 23, 2018

Abstract

Private equity firms have become common owners of established firms in concentrated markets. Antitrust authorities therefore intervene in mergers and acquisitions involving PE firms. In this article, we discuss the antitrust implications of an active PE market and whether there are any special characteristics of PE ownership that are important for antitrust regulation and enforcement. To gain some perspective, we approach the question from three pillars of industrial organization: (i) identifying and blocking mergers that create substantial market power; (ii) detecting and preventing predatory behavior; and (iii) detecting and preventing collusive behavior.

Keywords: Antitrust, Buyouts, Competition Policy, Private Equity

JEL Classification: G24, G34, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan and Persson, Lars and Tåg, Joacim, Private Equity Buyouts: Anti- or Pro-Competitive? (February 23, 2018). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Vol. 1, No. 1: 31–34, January 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128858

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Lars Persson

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Joacim Tåg (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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