Opportunistic Shirking Behavior During Unpaid Overtime

7 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2018

See all articles by Michael Lopez

Michael Lopez

Skidmore College

Brian Mills

University of Texas at Austin

Date Written: February 25, 2018

Abstract

We identify the presence of shirking by Major League Baseball umpires during indefinite unpaid overtime, as defined by extra innings. In the presence of new information about expected game length, umpires exert biases in ball and strike calls consistent with opportunistically reducing the likelihood of working additional time. General implications with respect to the effectiveness of salaried workers during unpaid overtime hours are discussed.

Keywords: shirking, personnel economics, baseball, generalized additive models

JEL Classification: JO1, M50

Suggested Citation

Lopez, Michael and Mills, Brian, Opportunistic Shirking Behavior During Unpaid Overtime (February 25, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3129084

Michael Lopez (Contact Author)

Skidmore College ( email )

815 North Broadway
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866-1632
United States

Brian Mills

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2317 Speedway
Austin, TX 78712
United States

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