Marital Infidelity: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 227-233, 2018.

Posted: 5 Mar 2018

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 23, 2018

Abstract

In this paper we focus on a married couple and analyze a game of marital infidelity. The husband can either be faithful to or cheat on his wife. The wife decides how much effort to expend monitoring her husband and she chooses monitoring effort m∈[0,1]. Our analysis of this strategic interaction leads to five results. First, we solve for the optimal m when the wife believes that her husband is certainly cheating on her. Second, we solve for the optimal m when the wife believes that her husband is faithful for sure. Third, given that the wife believes her husband is faithful with probability p, we determine the best response level of m as a function of p. Fourth, we explain why there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game between the husband and the wife. Finally, we show that there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the same husband-wife game.

Keywords: Cheating, Faithfulness, Monitoring, Mixed Strategy, Static Game

JEL Classification: J12, D81, C72

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., Marital Infidelity: A Game-Theoretic Analysis (February 23, 2018). Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 227-233, 2018.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129110

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

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