Meritocracy, Efficiency, Incentives and Voting in Cooperative Production: A Survey

21 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2018

See all articles by Carmen Bevia

Carmen Bevia

Universidad de Alicante

Luis C. Corchon

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2018

Abstract

This paper surveys selectively several contributions to the understanding of how cooperatives may cope with the interplay between meritocracy and efficiency when public decisions are taking by voting and the supply of labor is freely decided by each member. This outlines the main trade‐off faced by cooperatives. In particular, the degree of meritocracy is limited by three factors: (1) efficiency, because too much meritocracy encourages too much work from the socially optimal point of view; (2) meritocracy encourages sabotage; and (3) voting, because workers may prefer inefficient reward schemes as long as they are individually profitable.

Keywords: Cooperative production, growth, meritocracy, efficiency, incentives, voting

JEL Classification: D2, D9, O4

Suggested Citation

Bevia, Carmen and Corchon, Luis C., Meritocracy, Efficiency, Incentives and Voting in Cooperative Production: A Survey (March 2018). Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 89, Issue 1, pp. 87-107, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/apce.12190

Carmen Bevia (Contact Author)

Universidad de Alicante ( email )

Campus de San Vicente, sn
Alicante, 03690
Spain

Luis C. Corchon

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, 28903
Spain

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